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I. INTRODUCTION
The court system in the United States in many instances provides concurrent
jurisdiction to prospective litigants who have the opportunity to file their cases in
either state or federal court. For a number of reasons, parties often bring a case in both
state and federal court. I In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construc-
tion2 the United States Supreme Court severely limited the federal courts' ability to
abstain or stay actions to avoid these parallel proceedings.
This Comment will discuss the rationale and impact of the Moses decision by
first describing the abstention doctrine and identifying the circumstances that cause
litigants to bring suit in both state and federal court. The federal law prior to Moses
will be analyzed, first by examining the Supreme Court decisions and second by
considering how the lower courts interpreted those decisions. This Comment then will
address the reasons behind the Supreme Court's decision in Moses and its practical
effect. Finally, this Comment will examine lower courts' interpretations of past
Supreme Court decisions to help forecast their interpretation of the Moses decision.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
The abstention doctrine defines the circumstances under which a federal court
properly can decline to exercise or can postpone its jurisdiction.3 Chief Justice
Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia4 established the general rule of abstention when he
observed:
It is most true, that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally
true, that it must take jurisdiction, if it should .... We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or
the other would be treason to the constitution. 5
Despite this pronouncement, the federal courts have found at least three distinct
circumstances in which abstention may be proper. 6 The first circumstance in which
the courts have found abstention to be appropriate is called Pullman abstention,
1. This situation often is called "parallel proceedings" or duplicate litigation. It includes any situation in which
two or more suits are prosecuted simultaneously and "at least some of the issues and parties are so closely related that
the judgment of one will have res judicata effect on the other." Comment, Federal Court Stays and Dismissals in
Deference to Parallel State Court Proceedings: The Impact of Colorado River, 44 U. Cu. L. REv. 641, 641 n. 1 (1977).
2. 460 U.S. 1 (1983) [hereinafter referred to as Moses].
3. Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959).
4. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
5. Id. at 404.
6. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976); see also C. WRIGHT. THE
LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (4th ed. 1983).
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named after the leading case of Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.7 The
aim of this line of cases is to avoid deciding a federal constitutional question when
the case may be decided on the basis of state law. 8 The second situation in which
federal courts have found abstention to be proper is when the federal suit would
conflict needlessly with a state's administration of its affairs. 9 This situation is called
Burford abstention after Burford v. Sun Oil Co. ' 0 The third circumstance found to be
appropriate for abstention is called Younger abstention" I after the case of Younger v.
Harris.'2 Younger held that a federal court should refrain from hearing a constitu-
tional challenge to a pending state criminal action. 13 A court will abstain unless the
case involves "bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute." ' 4 This use
of abstention is justified on the grounds that such a case is an "improper intrusion on
the right of a state to enforce its laws in its own courts."' 5
Courts also have used abstention to avoid duplicate litigation on the grounds of
judicial economy. The Supreme Court has rejected this use of abstention 16 but it has
been adamantly retained by some circuits. 17 This Comment will demonstrate that the
liberal use of stays or dismissals to conserve judicial resources is no longer permis-
sible after Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction. '8
III. SITUATIONS IN WHICH ABSTENTION IS CLEAR
Abstention sometimes is proper in federal court to avoid duplicate litigation. 19 If
a state court already has taken over a res, then the federal court must decline
jurisdiction. 20 Abstention also is clear when the federal court is asked to decide a
declaratory judgment action and a state action that will effectively determine all of the
issues already is pending. 21 In addition, a federal court clearly can refuse to hear a
case when the same action is pending in another federal court. 22 The unclear situation,
at least prior to Moses, is when both the state and federal courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over an in personam action other than a declaratory judgment.
7. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
8. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976).
9. C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 52, at 308.
10. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
1I. The Court first formally called this practice abstention in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976). See C. WRIGiT, supra note 6, § 52A. at 320.
12. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
13. Id. at 53.
14. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 (1976).
15. C. WRiirr, supra note 6, § 52A, at 320.
16. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); see also infra note 64.
17. Microsoftware Computer Sys,. Inc. v. Ontel Corp.. 686 F.2d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 1982); Giulini v. Blessing,
654 F.2d 189, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1981); Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. United States Dist. Court. 588 F.2d 543, 544
(6th Cir. 1978); see infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
18. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
19. C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 52, at 315-16.
20. Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1939).
21. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491. 495 (1942).
22. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183-84 (1952).
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IV. FEDERAL ABSTENTION WHEN THE PARTIES HAVE BROUGHT SUIT IN
STATE COURT
A. The Scope of the Problem
Why would parties become involved in two cases, one in state court and one in
federal court, on the same cause of action? The motivation for the duplicate litigation
in a particular case will have a great effect on how favorable the federal court will be
towards abstention in that case, no matter what legal standard is applied. For example,
a federal court will be much less sympathetic to a plaintiff who filed the case in federal
court to harass the defendant than to a plaintiff who filed the case merely because the
state court suit was proceeding too slowly.23
Three basic types of duplicate litigation exist. 24 The first type, called a repetitive
suit,25 occurs when a plaintiff brings multiple suits on the same claim against the same
defendant in two or more forums. Multiple suits may be brought to harass the
defendant or to insure that at least one of the courts will obtain personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. 26 Multiple suits also are brought as a means of forum shopping
and for other tactical reasons.27 For example, a plaintiff in a quasi in rem action may
not know if the defendant will appear generally and submit to personal jurisdiction or
appear specially to defend the property. In this situation it may be to the plaintiff's
advantage to file suit in another jurisdiction where additional property may be
found. 28 Not only may this tactic allow additional recovery, but it also might induce
the defendant to appear generally in one jurisdiction to avoid duplicate litigation. 29
The second type of duplicate litigation is a reactive suit.30 A reactive suit is filed
by the defendant in the first action against the plaintiff of that action "either seeking
a declaration that he is not liable to the plaintiff or asserting an affirmative claim that
arises out of or is intimately related to the same transaction or occurrence that is the
subject of the first action." ' 3' Reactive suits may be brought to obtain the tactical
advantages of being the plaintiff in the proceeding, 32 to take advantage of or to avoid
the prejudices of a particular forum, 33 or to take advantage of a particular forum's
choice of law rule that provides more favorable substantive law to the original
23. E.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 17 n.20 (1983) (majority in dicta agreed
that a suit brought to harass the defendant may be stayed in deference to the state court proceedings).
24. Comment, supra note 1, at 642.
25. Vestal, Repetitive Litigation, 45 IOWA L. R~v. 525 (1960).
26. Comment, supra note 1, at 643.
27. Id.
28. Vestal, supra note 25, at 527.
29. The Supreme Court's holding in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) made this tactic less practicable. In
Shaffer the Court extended the minimum contacts test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) to
quasi in rem actions. Thus, the requirement for quasi in rem jurisdiction is minimum contacts between the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977). Mere ownership of property within a state is not
sufficient. Id. at 209.
30. Vestal, Reactive Litigation, 47 IowA L. REv. 11 (1961).
31. Comment, supra note 1, at 643.
32. Vestal, supra note 30, at 13. "Juries normally react in a more favorable manner to requests for relief from
plaintiffs than from defendants; there are some procedural advantages in the conduct of a lawsuit; and the plaintiff has more
control over the suit than does the defendant." Id.
33. Comment, supra note 1. at 643-44.
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defendant. 34 A defendant also might bring a reactive suit because the original suit is
proceeding too slowly. 35 A defendant might bring a reactive suit to gain advantages
provided by federal procedure 36 or because there exists a defense or counterclaim
based on federal law. 37 The defendant may be unable to remove the state court action
to federal court because the requirements for removal are not met. 38
The third type of duplicate litigation occurs when different named plaintiffs bring
separate class actions or shareholder derivative suits representing the same or similar
classes on the same cause of action. 39 Individual plaintiffs also may be in the process
of litigating the same cause of action. 40 Multiple class actions often are brought by
individual class members who desire to control the litigation4' or "to collect the
substantial attorneys' fees awarded the plaintiff in a successful class suit." 42
To the author's knowledge, no one has conducted a study of the prevalence of
repetitive, reactive, or multiple class suits. The lack of such a study is understandable,
since it would be difficult to trace the filings of the litigants in the multitude of
jurisdictions available. It is also unfortunate, since this kind of information could
indicate the extent to which judicial resources are wasted by duplicate litigation. If
courts knew that duplicate litigation occurred in a large number of federal cases, they
might be more sympathetic to abstention to avoid the "grand waste of efforts by both
the courts and parties. "43 However, if a study found that multiple suits were filed only
rarely, the federal courts probably would ignore the state court case and proceed to
judgment to protect the well-defined jurisdiction of the federal court.44 Thus, a study
34. Id.
35. Id. at 644.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. E.g., a defendant in a diversity case cannot remove to federal court if he or she is a citizen of the state in which
the action was brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982). A defendant also may have failed to file a petition for removal within
a thirty day period. Id. § 1446(b).
39. Comment, supra note 1, at 644. Multiple class action proceedings do not occur often because in order to certify
a common question class action under Federal Rule 23(b)(3), a court must find that a "class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." FED. R. Civ P. 23(b)(3). One of the factors
listed as important to this decision is "the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class." FED. R. Ctv, P. 23(b)(3)(B). Some courts have relied on this language
in refusing to certify a class action when other related suits are pending. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d
90, 107 (10th Cir. 1971); Barkel v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 51 F.R.D. 504, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see Comment. supra
note I, at 672.
40. Comment, supra note 1, at 672.
41. Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV L. REv. 1318, 1414 (1976).
42. Comment, supra note 1, at 644.
43. Microsoftware Computer Sys., Inc. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 1982).
44. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE. STUDY OFTIE DtviSioN OF JURSDICTION BEWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL CouRTs,
pt. I at 72 (Official Draft Sept. 25, 1965). "It is of first importance to have a definition [of jurisdiction] so clear cut that
it will not invite extensive threshold litigation over jurisdiction." Id.
[Llitigants should have the opportunity to determine which judicial system-state and federal-is both equipped
and inclined to hear their case and render a verdict without unnecessary delay. Also, greater certainty in this area
would result in a conservation of legal and judicial energies; energies unnecessarily expended when a case is
shuttled back and forth between the federal court and a state forum. Finally, the unconscionable delays and
increased costs which result from such uncertainty can only result in a diminished respect for our judicial
systems.
Ashman, Alfini, & Shapiro, Federal Abstention: Nei Perspectives on its Current Vitality, 46 Miss. L.J. 629, 629 (1975).
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indicating how often such duplicate litigation occurs could have a profound impact on
the balance struck in Moses between these two countervailing concerns. 45
B. The Supreme Court Decisions Prior to Moses
The federal courts prior to 1949 universally held that
the mere pendency of an action in personam in state court would not require, nor even
permit, a federal court to refuse to hear an action or to stay an action, and that instead both
state and federal actions should go forward until one of them resulted in a judgment that
might be asserted as res judicata in the other.46
Then two Second Circuit cases authorized stays when the parties had similar
proceedings pending in state court.47 At first, other courts did not follow these
decisions. However, between 1967 and 1976 many federal courts under an increasing
caseload began to abstain or to grant a stay48 when a similar state proceeding had been
filed. The Ninth Circuit indicated that it had discretion to take such action. 49
In 1976 the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue in Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States.50 The United States had brought suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado asserting certain water rights
in the State of Colorado.5' Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. section 1345, which
gives the district courts original jurisdiction of all suits brought by the United States. 52
Two months after the federal suit commenced, one of the defendants filed a motion
in state court "seeking an order directing service of process on the United States in
order to make it a party to proceedings [in state court] for the purpose of adjudicating
all of the Government's claims, both state and federal.'' 53 The United States was
served with process and was joined as a defendant pursuant to the McCarran
Amendment.5 4 The federal district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss,
45. Some indications imply that relatively few duplicate litigation cases occur between state and federal court. For
one thing, relatively few duplicate class actions occur. Seesupra note 39. Moreover, the state court may dismiss the action,
leaving the federal court to pursue the litigation alone. See, e.g., McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman
Eng'g Co., 263 A.2d 281 (Del. 1970); PowerTrain Inc. v. Stuver, 550 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1976). Some states even codified
the practice of stays or dismissals in subsequently filed suits. See, e.g., GA CODE ANN. § 9-2-44(a) (1982); ILL ANN, REV.
STAT. ch. 110, § 2-619(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1983); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 321 l(a)(4) (MeKinney 1970).
46. C. WRGnHT, supra note 6, at 316; see McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910).
47. P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.
1949).
48. Simmons v. Wetherell, 472 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973); Reichman v. Pittsburg
Nat'l. Bank, 465 F.2d 16 (3rd Cir. 1972); Thompson v. Boyle, 417 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
972 (1970); Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1967).
49. Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1975).
50. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
51. Id. at 805.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1982). This statute specifies that '[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United
States .. ." Id.
53. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 806 (1976).
54. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982). This statute provides as follows:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use
of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the
United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law by
purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States,
when a party to such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State laws are
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holding that the abstention doctrine required deference to the state court proceed-
ings.5 5 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that
abstention was inappropriate. 56 The Supreme Court's majority opinion, written by
Justice Brennan and joined by Justices White, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist,
began its discussion of the abstention issue by declaring that
[aibstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule. "The
doctrine of abstention ... is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a
District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. [Abstention] can be
justified . . . only in the exceptional circumstances, where the order to the parties to
repair to the State court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest." 57
The Court then said that abstention is appropriate in only three specific circum-
stances58 and was not appropriate merely to avoid duplicate litigation. 59 Although
judicial economy was not an adequate justification for abstention, the Court did state
that "there are principles unrelated to considerations of proper constitutional adju-
dication and regard for federal-state relations which govern in situations involving the
contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, either by the federal courts or
by state and federal courts." 60 The Court noted that these principles rest on consid-
erations of "[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial
resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation. ' 6' When the duplicate litiga-
tion is between the state and federal courts the Court indicated that as a general rule,
the pendency of an action in state court is no bar to similar proceedings in federal
court. 62 Due to the federal courts' "virtually unflagging obligation.., to exercise
the jurisdiction given them,' '63 the circumstances permitting dismissal for reasons of
wise judicial administration are considerably more limited than the circumstances in
which abstention is appropriate. 64 The Court said that "lt]he former circumstances,
though exceptional, do nevertheless exist."' 65 The factors to be considered in deter-
mining exceptional circumstances are: the inconvenience of the federal forum, the
desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, and the order in which jurisdiction was
inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject
to thejudgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances ...
Id.
55. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 806 (1976).
56. See United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115, 122 (10th Cir. 1974).
57. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976) (quoting County of
Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959)).
58. Id. at 814-17; see supra notes 6-15 and accompanying text.
59. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. The Court said that judicial economy is not an appropriate reason for abstention. Yet in this case, the Court
essentially abstained, as it did exactly what it defined abstention to mean-declining to exercise or postponing jurisdiction.
See Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959). The Court tried to distinguish between the
abstention doctrine (which is based on important state interests) and the situation in the case at hand (in which no state
interest existed). With this distinction, the Court stressed that a much higher standard of review would need to be met to
justify dismissal in deference to state court proceedings.
65. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976).
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obtained by the concurrent forums. 66 The Court added that "[n]o one factor is
necessarily determinative; a carefully considered judgment taking into account both
the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the combination of factors counselling
against that exercise is required. Only the clearest of justifications will warrant
dismissal." 67
Although the Court allowed a dismissal in Colorado River, it stressed the
unusual nature of the suit and the presence of factors warranting dismissal. The most
important factor in this case was the McCarran Amendment, 68 which the majority
found to evince a clear federal policy of avoiding piecemeal adjudication of water
rights in a river system. 69 The Court pointed to other factors justifying dismissal:
(a) the apparent absence of any proceedings in the District Court, other than the filing of
the complaint, prior to the motion to dismiss, (b) the extensive involvement of state water
rights occasioned by this suit naming 1000 defendants, (c) the 300-mile distance between
the District Court in Denver and the [other state water right] proceedings. 70
The Court was careful to limit the justifications for dismissal to the facts of the
case. The Court did not decide whether
despite the McCarran Amendment, dismissal would be warranted if more extensive
proceedings had occurred in the District Court prior to dismissal, if the involvement of
state water rights were less extensive than it is here, or if the state proceedings were in
some respect inadequate to resolve the federal claims. 71
The dissent agreed with the majority's formulation of the applicable test in
duplicate litigation cases, but believed that application of this test required that the
Court proceed with the litigation in this case. 72
The Supreme Court in Colorado River limited to exceptional circumstances the
federal courts' ability to dismiss an action to prevent duplicate litigation. In deter-
mining exceptional circumstances, the factors in favor of dismissal are balanced
against the federal court's virtually unflagging obligation to hear the case. 73 A federal
court should not dismiss a case unless the factors in favor of dismissal clearly
outweigh the court's jurisdictional obligation. 74 Since the dissent approved of the
majority's test, Colorado River made clear that at least exceptional circumstances
must be found before a federal court can dismiss a case in deference to state
66. Id.
67. Id. at 818-19.
68. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982).
69. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States. 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976); see also Arizona v. San
Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 103 S. Ct. 3201 (1983), reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 209 (1984). But see United States v.
Adair. 723 F.2d 1394, 1400-07 (9th Cir. 1983) (court stated that abstention in the Colorado River situation (duplicate
water rights litigation under the McCarran Amendment) can be avoided by limiting the federal court's jurisdiction to one
state).
70. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 820 (1976).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 821-26 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
73. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1983).
74. Id. at 819.
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proceedings. Colorado River was a considerable limitation on the liberal dismissals
some circuits previously had allowed in duplicate litigation cases. 75
However two years later the Supreme Court's decision in Will v. Calvert Fire
Insurance Co. 76 raised new questions and uncertainties concerning the dismissal
issue. In Will, American Mutual Reinsurance Company sued Calvert Fire Insurance
Company in state court seeking a declaration that Calvert remained subject to a
reinsurance pool agreement that it had attempted to rescind. 77 Six months later,
Calvert's answer raised a defense based on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.78
However, the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of cases arising under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 79 Thus, on the same day Calvert filed its answer in
state court, Calvert filed a complaint seeking enforcement of the Act and damages in
federal court. 80 American Mutual moved to stay proceedings in federal court because
the state court suit commenced six months earlier than the federal court suit and
included identical claims and defenses except Calvert's claim for damages.,
Three months later the federal district court granted a stay of all aspects of
Calvert's federal action subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of both courts, noting
that only Calvert's claim for damages was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal court. 82 A stay differs from a dismissal in that the federal court retains
jurisdiction over the case. If the state court action does not proceed satisfactorily, the
federal court can proceed with the case at the request of one of the parties. 83 The other
important aspect of a stay order is that it ordinarily is not considered final for the
purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(a). 84
When Federal District Judge Will rejected two motions to reconsider his stay
order and refused to certify an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section
1292(b), Calvert petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for a writ of
mandamus directing Judge Will to proceed to adjudicate its federal claims.8 5 The
court of appeals granted the writ of mandamus and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 86
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion began by determining the appropriate
standard of review for the case. The Court distinguished the standard of review on
75. See supra notes 47-48.
76. 437 U.S. 655 (1978), on remand, 506 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1978).
77. Id. at 658.
78. Id.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
80. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 658 (1978).
81. Id. at 659.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 665.
84. See, e.g., Amy v. Philadelphia Tmnsp. Co., 266 F.2d 869 (3rd Cir. 1959); Mottolese v. Preston, 172 F.2d 308
(2d Cir. 1949). But see Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1967); Hickey v. Johnson, 9 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1925).
85. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967). A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and traditionally
has been used in the federal courts "to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to
compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so." Id. (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U.S.
21, 26 (1943)). As an equitable remedy, a writ of mandamus can be invoked only when a direct appeal is not possible,
Hines v. D'Artois, 531 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1976); American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct. for N. Cal.,
538 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1976), and an abuse ofjudicial power would result if the lower court were not subject to review.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953).
86. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
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direct appeal87 from that of a writ of mandamus. 88 Although a "simple showing of
error may suffice to obtain a reversal on direct appeal, to issue a writ of mandamus
under such circumstances 'would undermine the settled limitations upon the power of
an appellate court to review interlocutory orders.' "9 In order for a writ of mandamus
to issue, the petitioner must show that the issuance of the writ is "clear and
indisputable.' ' 90
The Court then turned to the abstention issue, declaring that
[i]t is well established that "the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to
proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction." It is
equally well settled that a district court is "under no compulsion to exercise that
jurisdiction," where the controversy may be settled more expeditiously in the state
court. 91
The plurality relied on Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co.92 as support for its
assertion that a district court is not compelled to exercise its jurisdiction. The other
Justices attacked this reliance. Justice Blackmun, who concurred in the judgment,
said that Brillhart, a diversity case, had no application to a case concerning federal
issues.93 He also noted that even if Brillhart were applicable, the holding in that
decision was limited by the Court's decision in Colorado River.94 Justice Brennan in
his dissent said that:
[C]rucial to this Court's approval of the District Court's dismissal of the suit in Brillhart
were two factors absent here. First, because the federal suit was founded on diversity, state
rather than federal law would govern the outcome of the federal suit. Second, and more
significantly, the federal suit was for a declaratory judgment. Under the terms of the
provision empowering federal courts to entertain declaratory judgment suits, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201. the assumption of jurisdiction over such suits is discretionary. 95
The plurality also considered McClellan v. Carland,96 in which the Supreme
Court granted a writ of mandamus under facts similar to Will.97 Justice Rehnquist said
that
[s]uch an automatic exercise of authority may well have been appropriate in a day when
Congress had authorized fewer claims for relief in the federal courts, so that duplicative
87. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 661 (1978) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1982)) (On direct appeal
"a court of appeals has broad authority to 'modify, vacate, set aside or reverse' an order of a district court, and it may
direct such further action on remand 'as may be just under the circumstances').
88. All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982) (a writ of mandamus may issue only when "necessary or appropriate
in aid of their respective jurisdictions").
89. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655. 661 (1978) (quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98 n.6
(1967)).
90. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953).
91. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 662-63 (1978) (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282
(1910) and Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942)).
92. 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
93. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 667 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 671 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The declaratory judgment statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982) provides, "[i]n
a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ...any court of the United States, upon filing of an appropriate
pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration. Id.
96. 217 U.S. 268 (1910).
97. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 663 (1978).
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litigation and the concomitant tension between state and federal courts could rarely result.
However, as the overlap between state claims and federal claims increased, this Court
soon recognized that situations would often arise when it would be appropriate to defer to
the state courts. 98
Far more important to the Court was the fact that Colorado River concerned an
appeal from a dismissal, while Will dealt with a writ of mandamus after a stay. 99
Although the Seventh Circuit categorized the stay as "equivalent to a dismissal," 00
the plurality felt that since "Calvert remained free to urge reconsideration of [the
Judge's] decision to defer based on new information as to the progress of the state
case; to this extent, at least, deferral was not 'equivalent to a dismissal.' "10,
The Court defended the rule that leaves to the discretion of the district court the
decision to stay proceedings because of concurrent state litigation. 102 The Court said
that if the judge had scheduled the case for a later date on his calendar, it would have
had the same effect as granting a stay; yet a writ of mandamus would not be
appropriate in such a situation. '0 3 The district court achieved this result by granting
a stay; yet this does not change the underlying legal controversy. 1° 4 The Court
concluded that since the matter was committed to the district court's discretion, it
could "not be said that the litigant's right to a particular result was clear and
indisputable." 105
Justice Blackmun, the fifth vote for reversal, concurred in the judgment only
because the district judge did not have the guidance of the Colorado River decision
when he granted the stay order.' 0 6 Justice Brennan dissented and Chief Justice
Burger, Justice Marshall, and Justice Powell joined in this dissent. Justice Brennan
said that the plurality's opinion had "an ominous potential for the abdication of
federal court jurisdiction in the opinion's disturbing indifference to 'the virtually
unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given
them."' 107 He believed that obedience to that obligation becomes even more impor-
tant when the case is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court.108 He also
said that the plurality ignored the analytical framework of Colorado River, a case
"whose vitality [was] not questioned, 109 and that no exceptional circumstances that
could be weighed against the district court's unflagging obligation to exercise its
exclusive jurisdiction existed in this case. "10
98. Id.
99. Id. at 664.
100. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
101. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 665 (1978) (emphasis in original).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 666.
106. Id. at 668 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 669 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 674.
110. Id. at 676.
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Will v. Calvert is difficult to interpret because of the circumstances of the case
and the split of the court. Had Justice Rehnquist's opinion commanded a majority,
lower courts would have been able to use a standard of discretion in staying actions
in deference to parallel proceedings. Moreover, as long as the lower court used the
language of stay rather than a dismissal, they would be able to insulate themselves
from appellate review. " '
However, the plurality opinion did not speak for the Court since Justice
Blackmun voted for reversal only because the district judge had not had the guidance
of the Court's opinion in Colorado River when he granted the stay. 1 2 Therefore, a
majority of the Court, Justice Blackmun and the four dissenters, agreed that (1) the
Brillhart decision is not authority when the case is not a diversity case concerning a
declaratory judgment; (2) the Colorado River test is still applicable when a federal
court is considering a stay in deference to state court proceedings; and (3) a writ of
mandamus can issue to vacate a stay that is not consistent with the holding of
Colorado River. "13 Indeed, on remand the Seventh Circuit interpreted the case in this
manner. 114 However, the lower courts have not always uniformly interpreted plurality
decisions, and no clear cut standard for interpreting these decisions has ever been
delineated. ' 15
A lower court eager to lessen its docket easily could rely on the plurality's
opinion in Will as authority for a standard of discretion in cases concerning duplicate
litigation. 116 Moreover, Will is further complicated by the fact that it concerned the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court. It is impossible to tell how many of the
dissenters might have agreed with the plurality if the case had concerned only
concurrent litigation.
C. The Lower Courts' Decisions: The Disparity in Interpretation of the Supreme
Court
The Supreme Court's decisions prior to Moses left much room for interpretative
variation by the lower courts. Some circuits held that because of the lack of a clear
majority in Will, Colorado River's strict test requiring "exceptional circumstances"
to warrant dismissal was in no way limited by Will v. Calvert. " 7 The Second Circuit
held that even absent a majority in Will, Colorado River addressed only the propriety
of dismissals and that at the very least the question of stays was left open. 118 Other
circuits held that Will fixed the appropriate standard (a standard of discretion) for
111. C. Wmaoirr, supra note 6, at 319.
112. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 668 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
113. See C. WRiGuT, supra note 6. at 319.
114. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 586 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
115. See Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 756, 756 (1980).
116. See infra note 123.
117. Strode Publishers, Inc. v. Holtz, 665 F.2d 333, 336 (11 th Cir. 1982) (court denied dismissal despite the state
court defendant's having filed in federal court when he could have removed instead); Tover v. Billmeyer, 609 F.2d 1291,
1293 (9th Cir. 1980); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Anderson, 610 F.2d 1126, 1127 (3rd Cir. 1979).
118. Giulini v. Blessing, 654 F.2d 189, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1981).
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federal court stays, while Colorado River is binding only on outright dismissals.' 1 9
*Two lower court opinions, both in the Seventh Circuit, were particularly
distressing to those who felt that the lower courts should hold to the exceptional
circumstances test of Colorado River. 20 The first case dealt with the continuing saga
of Will. In Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co., 121 Judge
Will reconsidered his stay of the proceedings in light of Colorado River as the Circuit
Court had directed.' 22 Judge Will found that Calvert's damage claim was without
merit and dismissed that claim for relief, leaving only those claims between the parties
subject to the state court's concurrent jurisdiction. The district court then granted a
stay, holding that this case was different from Colorado River because it dealt with
a stay rather than an outright dismissal and because Calvert failed to use the 28 U.S.C.
section 1441 removal procedure, even though it was available on the basis of diversity
of citizenship. 2 3 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the stay, reiterating Judge
Will's assertion of the differences between this case and Colorado River. 124 The court
said that Calvert's filing of the federal suit was "a reactive defense maneuver . . . to
delay the state proceeding and postpone final resolution of its dispute. . . ." 125 The
court held that the federal district court could stay its proceedings pending the
outcome of state proceedings "at least where the district judge has found the federal
suit to be vexatious. ' ' 12 6
Therefore, in a case that had been remanded to the district court so that it could
apply Colorado River's exceptional circumstances test, the Circuit Court upheld a
stay solely because the suit was vexatious. Colorado River did not list harassment of
the defendant as an exceptional circumstance that warranted dismissal, and the Circuit
Court's holding seems in conflict with its own earlier opinion. 27
Three years later, in Microsoftware Computer Systems v. Ontel Corp., z128 the
Seventh Circuit was even more lenient in granting a stay than it was in American
Mutual. Ontel originally brought suit in state court alleging a breach of contract by
Microsoftware Computer Systems (MCS). ' 2 9 MCS counterclaimed in state court and
filed suit in federal court based on diversity. The district court denied Ontel's motion
to stay proceedings and Ontel appealed.130
119. Microsoftware Computer Sys. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 1982) (court held that it was an abuse
of discretion for the district court to deny a stay in the case); Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. United States Dist. Ct.,
588 F.2d 543, 544 (6th Cir. 1978).
120. See, e.g., Note, Jurisdiction-A Stay of Federal Court Proceedings Involving an Issue Within Exclusive
Federal Jurisdiction, Pending Termination of a Parallel State Court Action, Is Justified When the Federal Suit Is Found
to Be Vexatious, 55 No'rRE DAMriE LAW. 601 (1980).
121. 459 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. III. 1978).
122. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 586 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1978). The Court did not issue a writ of mandamus because
Judge Will agreed to reconsider the stay on his own motion.
123. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859, 863-64 (N.D. Ill. 1978), affd, 600 F.2d
1228 (7th Cir. 1979).
124. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228. 1234 (7th Cir. 1979).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1235.
127. Compare Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 586 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1978) with Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American
Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1979).
128. 686 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1982).
129. Id. at 533.
130. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit first addressed whether it had jurisdiction to hear an appeal
from the denial of a stay and concluded that the denial of a stay was equivalent to an
order refusing to grant an injunction and therefore was immediately appealable under
28 U.S.C. section 1292(a)(1). 13 1 The court then addressed the denial of a stay and
held that the denial was an abuse of discretion. 132 The court restated the Colorado
River rule that the federal courts have an "unflagging obligation.., to exercise the
jurisdiction given them .... ,,133 Citing Will, the court also said that the decision to
postpone exercising jurisdiction is a matter committed to the district court's discre-
tion. 134
The court said that a number of factors in Microsoftivare favored dismissal. First,
the court found no federal interest since Microsoftware was a diversity case.' 35
Second, the court said that since the state action was filed first and since nothing
indicated that the state court could not fully and fairly resolve the parties' dispute,
proceeding with the case would be "gratuitous interference" with the state court
litigation. 136 Finally, the court said that "there would be a grand waste of efforts by
both the courts and parties in litigating the same issues regarding the same contract
in two forums at once." 137 This holding does not appear to conform to a test requiring
that a court abstain only under "exceptional circumstances" in which only the
"clearest of justifications" warrant dismissal. 138
D. The Moses Decision
In 1983 in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction139 the
Supreme Court addressed the uncertainty of the lower court opinions. Cone Memorial
and Mercury Construction had entered into a construction contract that contained a
binding arbitration clause. ' 40 A dispute arose under the contract, and when it was not
resolved, Cone Memorial refused to pay Mercury Construction the contract price. 141
Cone Memorial then filed an action in state court seeking a declaration that Mercury
Construction had no right to arbitrate. 142 In response, Mercury Construction filed an
action in federal court seeking an order compelling arbitration under section 4 of the
131. Id. at 534.
132. Id. at 538.
133. Id. at 537 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).
134. Id. at 537.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 538 (quoting Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942)). However, note that Brillhart
concerned a declaratory judgment action. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
137. 686 F.2d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 1982).
138. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976). The court could have
held that since the defendant could have removed to federal court in the original action under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976),
but did not, a federal interest in favor of dismissal was present in the case. The federal interest was that of upholding the
procedural requirements of removal. This might have been an "exceptional circumstance" to warrant dismissal. However,
the court did not list this as a significant factor and probably would have found that dismissal was warranted without it.
Colorado River seemed to imply that a federal interest had to be present to warrant dismissal. Microsoftware held
that a stay was required when no federal interest existed. In this way, the court strayed from the Colorado River holding,
at least if one believes that Colorado River applies to stays as well as dismissals. See infra text accompanying note 181.
139. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
140. Id. at 4-5.
141. Id. at 6.
142. Id. at 7.
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Arbitration Act.143 Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. The district
court granted a motion to stay the federal suit since the state action contained the
identical issue of the arbitrability of Mercury Construction's claim. 44 Mercury
Construction sought review of the stay by both a direct appeal and a petition for
mandamus. 145
The Supreme Court first had to determine whether the district court's stay order
was appealable under 28 U.S.C. section 1291.146 The issue was of critical importance
because, as was pointed out in Will, if an order can be reviewed only by a writ of
mandamus, then the moving party has the burden of showing that its right to the
issuance of the writ is "clear and indisputable." 147 In a direct appeal, "a simple
showing of error may suffice." 48
The stay order would have been appealable in Moses only if it had been a "final
decision" within section 1291.149 In making this determination, Justice Brennan first
looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v.
Epstein,150 a Pullman abstention case,' 5 1 in which the Court held that the district
judge's stay was a final order since the "[a]ppellant was effectively out of court." 5 2
Justice Brennan said that finality was even clearer in Moses. "A district court
stay pursuant to Pullman abstention is entered with the expectation that the federal
litigation will resume in the event that the plaintiff does not obtain relief in state court
on state-law grounds." 153 By contrast, since Moses concerned the identical substan-
tive issue in both state and federal courts, a stay in federal court pending resolution
in state court would preclude further litigation in the federal forum. The state court's
judgment on the issue would be res judicata.154 Thus, even more clearly than in
Idlewild, Mercury Construction was effectively out of court. Therefore, the stay order
amounted to a dismissal of the suit and was appealable as final under 28 U.S.C.
section 1291.155
Moreover, even if the stay order were not final for the purposes of appeal, Justice
Brennan said that it nevertheless would be appealable within the Cohen v. Beneficial
Loan Corp. ' 56 exception to the finality rule. To fall within this exception, "the order
must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue
completely separate from the merits, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from
143. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
144. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 7 (1983).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 8.28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) provides: "[the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all
final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
Court."
147. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655,662 (1978) (quoting United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576 (1889)).
148. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 661 (1978).
149. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 8 (1983).
150. 370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 (1962).
151. I.e., a case in which the federal court abstained to avoid a decision of a federal constitutional question when
the case could be decided on the basis of state law. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
152. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 (1962).
153. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 10 (1983).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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a final judgment." 57 Justice Brennan said that the order in Moses clearly met the
second and third of these criteria.158
An order that amounts to a refusal to adjudicate the merits plainly presents an important
issue separate from the merits. For the same reason, this order would be entirely
unreviewable if not appealed now. Once the state court decided the issue of arbitrability,
the federal court would be bound to honor that determination as res judicata.159
The case additionally met the first criterion, that of conclusively determining the
disputed question, because presumably the judge would not have granted the stay
unless he expected the state court to resolve the issues adequately. 60
The Court turned to the propriety of the district court's order of a stay in
deference to the litigation in state court. 16 The Court first reviewed its decision in
Colorado River 62 and then addressed Cone Memorial's assertion that the Supreme
Court's decision in Will 6 3 undermined Colorado River's exceptional circumstances
test. Cone Memorial contended that the plurality opinion in Will had either overruled
or substantially modified the Court's holding in Colorado River.
64
The Court pointed out that Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Will did not command
a majority of Justices. Five of the Justices in Will, Justice Blackmun and the four
dissenters, agreed on the vitality of the Colorado River test. 165
Even assuming the vitality of Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Will, the majority
in Moses drew a distinction between Will and Moses. 66 Will concerned a petition for
a writ of mandamus, in which a petitioner must show a clear and indisputable right
to the writ.' 67 Even Justice Rehnquist admitted in Will that the petitioner in that case
might have succeeded on a proper appeal. 168
The Court then addressed Cone Memorial's contention that the opinions of
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun in Will require greater deference to the
discretion of the district court than was given to the court of appeals in this case.' 69
Justice Brennan agreed that
the decision whether to defer to the state courts is necessarily left to the discretion of the
district court in the first instance. Yet to say that the district court has discretion is not to
say that its decision is unreviewable; such discretion must be exercised under the relevant
standard prescribed by this Court. In this case, the relevant standard is Colorado River's
exceptional-circumstances test, as elucidated by the factors discussed in that case. 170
157. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand
v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)).
158. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. I. 12 (1983).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 13.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 13-16.
163. Id. at 16.
164. Id. at 17.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 18.
167. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 661-62 (1978).
168. Id. at 665.
169. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1983).
170. Id. at 19.
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The Court then applied the Colorado River factors to the circumstances of the
case but did not find the exceptional circumstances required to uphold the district
court's stay. 171 Cone Memorial conceded that the court had not assumed jurisdiction
over any res and that the federal court was not a less convenient forum than the state
court. 1
7 2
In Moses the Court found that the remaining factors, avoidance of piecemeal
litigation and the order in which jurisdiction was obtained, actually counseled against
a stay. 17 3 Cone Memorial was involved in two disputes here, one with Mercury
Construction concerning Mercury's claim for delay and impact costs, which was
subject to an arbitration agreement, and one with the architect for indemnity, which
was not subject to an arbitration agreement. 174 Therefore, in this case federal law
required piecemeal litigation since "[ulnder the Arbitration Act, an arbitration
agreement must be enforced notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are
parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement.' ' 75 If the
dispute with Mercury Construction were arbitrable, then Cone Memorial's disputes
would be resolved separately, one by arbitration and the other, if necessary, in state
court. If the dispute were not arbitrable, then both disputes would be resolved in state
court. Thus, the federal court's decision to proceed with the case would not cause
piecemeal resolution of the parties' underlying dispute. 176
The Court then turned to the order in which the two courts obtained jurisdiction.
Although the state court obtained jurisdiction nineteen days before the federal court,
Justice Brennan felt that "priority should not be measured exclusively by which
complaint was filed first, but rather in terms of how much progress has been made in
the two actions."' 77 In this case, the state court suit had had no substantial
proceedings, while when the stay was granted, the federal court had taken most of the
steps necessary to resolve the arbitrability issue.' 78
In addition, the Court noted that federal law, the Arbitration Act, was to be
applied. Although the Court admitted that this source-of-law factor was not as
significant as in Will, since concurrent jurisdiction was at issue here, the Court
stressed that:
our task in cases such as this is not to find some substantial reason for the exercise of
federal jurisdiction by the district court; rather the task is to ascertain whether there exist
"exceptional" circumstances, the "clearest of justifications," that can suffice under
Colorado River to justify the surrender of that jurisdiction .... [T]he presence of
federal-law issues must always be a major consideration against surrender. 79
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 20.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 21.
178. Id. at 22.
179. Id. at 25-26 (emphasis in original).
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Another factor weighing against the stay was the possible inadequacy of the state
court proceeding, since substantial room for doubt existed that Mercury Construction
would be able to obtain an order in state court compelling Cone Memorial to
arbitrate. 180
Finally, the Court dealt with Cone Memorial's contention that a stay was less
onerous than a dismissal, since Mercury Construction was free to urge the reopening
of the federal case if the state suit failed to adequately adjudicate its rights. Therefore,
Cone Memorial contended, Colorado River's test should not apply. Justice Brennan
declared that "a stay is as much a refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction as a
dismissal.' 8 1 A district court would not grant a stay or a dismissal if it did not think
the state court would provide an adequate resolution of the dispute. 182 Indeed, a court
would seriously abuse its discretion if it granted a stay or dismissal without such a
belief. 183
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Moses and Chief Justice Burger and Justice
O'Connor joined his dissent. The dissent stated that the district judge's stay order was
not sufficiently final to be appealable under section 1291. Justice Rehnquist first said
that if the district court merely had set the trial date two months away rather than
staying the action, the order would have been subject to review only by a writ of
mandamus or by a permissive interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. section
1292(b). 184 The dissent remarked that this stay was no more final than setting the trial
date and that the stay order was tentative. 85 The stay order was subject to change "on
a showing that the state proceedings were being delayed, either by the Hospital or by
the court, or that the state courts were not applying the federal Act, or that some other
reason for a change had arisen."' 186
Justice Rehnquist said that the majority had created uncertainty regarding when
a district court order in a pending case can be appealed. 87 He said that "[t]his
uncertainty gives litigants opportunities to disrupt or delay proceedings by taking
colorable appeals from interlocutory orders, not only in cases nearly identical to this
but also in cases which the ingenuity of counsel disappointed by a district court's
ruling can analogize to this one."' 188 Since the dissenters differed in their view of the
180. Id. at 26-27.
181. Id. at 28.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 31.
188. Id. at 31-32. Justice Rehnquist's concern has not been proved to be entirely meritorious. True, the federal
courts have followed the Moses decision holding that a stay in deference to duplicate state court litigation is directly
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Koke v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 730 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1984); Herrington v.
County of Sonoma, 706 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1983). However, they have been reluctant to extend the Moses finality rule
beyond abstention or abstention-like cases. See EEOC v. Neches Butane Prods. Co., 704 F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1983).
This result necessarily follows from footnote 11 of the Moses decision, in which the Court stated that there must be legal
impossibility to the suit in federal court (in these cases it would be the res judicata effect of the state court judgment that
would render the suit in federal court legally impossible) as opposed to practical or economic impossibility. 460 U.S. I,
10 n.ll (1983).
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stay order's appealability, they did not address whether the district court's order was
proper in this case.189
E. The Impact of the Moses Decision
The Supreme Court's decision in Moses had a powerful effect on the standard to
be applied when a federal court decides whether to stay or dismiss an action in
deference to parallel state court proceedings. Moses was strengthened further by the
dissenters' failure to express displeasure at the majority's extending the Colorado
River test to stays as well as dismissals. Although the dissenting Justices were in no
way required to reach the issue, since they disagreed on the appealability of the stay
order under 28 U.S.C. section 1291,190 they do seem to have retreated from their
formerly vigorous stand on the subject. 191 Thus, the Court probably will not change
its position on the subject in the near future.
The Court's opinion in Moses has created a number of practical repercussions.
The Court clearly extended Colorado River to include stays as well as dismissals. The
Court did this in two ways. First, by allowing a direct appeal from a stay whenever
a party is "effectively out of court" or falls within the Cohen v. Beneficial Loan
Corp. 192 exception to the finality rule, the Court removed the district court's ability
to insulate itself from review. Cohen's two conditions will apply to the vast majority
of cases. 193 A district judge would consider a stay or dismissal only if the issues in
both courts were so similar that a decision in state court would effectively preclude
the parties' federal court claims. Moreover, Cohen's exception to the finality rule will
apply to almost all stays in deference to state court proceedings. A refusal to
adjudicate the merits of a case always will present an important issue separate from
the merits. 194 The order always will be entirely unreviewable if not appealed
immediately, since the federal court will be bound to honor the state court judg-
ment. 195 A case concerning a stay almost always will meet the last criterion, that of
conclusively determining the disputed question, because a district court presumably
would grant a stay only if it expected the state court to adequately determine the
issues. 196 Second, the Court held that no real difference exists between a stay and a
dismissal. Thus, the Colorado River standard for review applies to both. 197 There-
fore, the lower court cases that held that Colorado River applies only to dismissals are
no longer good law. 198
189. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 35 (1983).
190. Id.
191. See Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 657-67 (1978).
192. 337 U.S. 541 (1949); see supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Koke v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 730 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1984); Herrington v. County of Sonoma,
706 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1983).
194. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 13.
197. Id.; see supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit confirmed this proposition in Giardina v.
Fontana, 733 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1984).
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The Moses decision also destroyed the precedential value of Will. The Court
achieved this end with three different rationales. First, the Court explained that the
plurality in Will did not command a majority and, therefore, was of no precedential
value. 199 Second, the Court distinguished Will because it came to the Court through
a petition for writ of mandamus rather than a direct appeal. The Court then greatly
expanded the availability of a direct appeal from a stay. 20° Third, the Court empha-
sized that the plurality's statement in Will that the decision to stay or dismiss
proceedings is within the discretion of the district court did not establish a standard
of review. 20' The standard of review to be applied is Colorado River's exceptional
circumstances test. 202 Therefore, the lower court cases that accepted Will as authority
for granting the district court discretion in such actions no longer can be considered
good law. 203
Moses also strengthened the Colorado River test by clarifying that the party
seeking the stay or dismissal has the burden of proof; there must "exist 'exceptional'
circumstances the 'clearest of justifications' that can suffice under Colorado River to
justify the surrender of that jurisdiction."204 Therefore, the mere absence of factors
that weigh against dismissal is insufficient.
Finally, in Moses the Court made clear that two factors besides those enumerated
in Colorado River were to be considered. One factor is whether federal law is to be
applied. 205 The absence of federal issues will weigh in favor of dismissal in "rare
circumstances." 2 0 6 The second factor brought forth in Moses is the inadequacy of the
state forum. 20 7 This factor, however, was framed in terms of the inadequacy rather
than the adequacy of the state forum. Therefore, since the Court has held that the
absence of factors weighing in favor of dismissal is insufficient, 208 the adequacy of
the state forum to resolve the dispute probably will not weigh in favor of dismissal.
The way the Court framed the second factor seems dispositive of the way the federal
courts should handle its absence. Indeed, several courts have agreed with this
interpretation.2 0 9 Thus, Moses seems to have overruled the lower court decisions that
failed to apply the Colorado River test when determining whether to stay proceedings
in deference to parallel state litigation. 2' 0
199. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 17 (1983); see supra notes 164-65 and
accompanying text.
200. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1. 18 (1983); see supra notes 166-68 and
accompanying text.
201. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. I, 19 (1983); see supra notes 169-70 and
accompanying text.
202. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. I, 19 (1983).
203. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit confirmed this proposition in Illinois Bell
Telephone v. Illinois Commerce Commission. 740 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1984).
204. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.. 460 U.S. I, 25-26 (1983) (emphasis in original).
205. Id. at 23. Justice Brennan indicated that this factor was brought forth in Will, in which the four dissenters and
Justice Blackmun had agreed that the fact that federal law was to be applied was a significant factor weighing against the
stay.
206. Id. at 26.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. E.g., Forehand v. First Ala. Bank of Dothan, 727 F.2d 1033, 1035 (1 lth Cir. 1984); Kruse v. Snowshoe Co.,
715 F.2d 120, 123 (4th Cir. 1983).
210, See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
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Considering the lower courts' past attempts to limit the strong language of
Colorado River,21' a possibility exists that some lower courts will do so in the future.
However, the lower courts will find this task much more difficult after Moses. A
lower court now has to work within the factors outlined in Colorado River and Moses,
regardless of whether the case concerns a stay or a dismissal.21 2 Also, in Moses the
Court emphasized that the burden of proof is on the party seeking dismissal.21 3 Thus,
a lower court will have difficulty granting a stay or dismissal without a powerful
justification. Therefore, the lower courts that made frequent use of stays in such cases
probably will not be able to do so as easily in the future.
Yet, as the dissent in Moses pointed out, nothing in the majority's opinion
prevents a district court from setting long calendar dates in cases subject to parallel
state litigation.21 4 Such decisions would not be considered final so as to be reviewable
on direct appeal, but only would be subject to a writ of mandamus, in which the
petitioner would have to show a clear and indisputable right to the issuance of the
writ. 21 5 However, these silent stays probably will never become a common practice
since most district judges probably will follow the spirit as well as the letter of Moses.
F. The Application of Moses
Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co.2 16 and Mi-
crosoftware Computer Systems v. Ontel Corp.,217 will be analyzed to determine if
their holdings would be different under Moses and to give insight into the impact of
Moses on subsequent lower court decisions. Recent decisions applying Moses also
will be discussed.
In American Mutual the Seventh Circuit upheld a stay because the plaintiff's suit
was vexatious.2 18 This case is easy to analyze because the majority's opinion in Moses
addressed it in a footnote.2 t9 Justice Brennan indicated that deference to state
litigation because the federal suit was reactive or vexatious "has considerable
merit.' '220 The Moses majority made clear that the harassment of the defendant may
be an "exceptional circumstance" that favors dismissal. 22' Therefore, the Seventh
Circuit's decision in American Mutual probably would have been no different had the
case arisen subsequent to Moses.
Microsoftware Computer Systems v. Ontel is quite different, however. In that
case, the Seventh Circuit held it was an abuse of discretion not to stay an action in
deference to parallel state proceedings. 222 The case was a diversity case, so the court
211. Id.
212. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 13 (1983).
213. Id. at 25-26.
214. Id. at 30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 18.
216. 600 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1979).
217. 686 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1982).
218. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1235 (7th Cir. 1979).
219. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 17-18 n.20 (1983).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Microsoftware Computer Sys. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 1982).
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said that no federal interest in the litigation existed. 223 The court also said that since
the state court could adequately resolve the dispute, to proceed with the federal
litigation would be "gratuitous interference" with the state court. 224 Moses clearly
has overruled this case. In Moses the Court said that the lack of federal issues would
weigh in favor of dismissal only in "rare circumstances." 2 2 5 Moreover, the adequacy
of the state forum is not a factor that favors dismissal.22 6 The court could have said
that since the defendant in the state action could have removed to federal court under
28 U.S.C. section 1441 but did not, the federal interest in upholding the procedural
requirements for removal supported dismissing the case. 227 However, any single
factor favoring dismissal probably would not be sufficient here. In Moses the Court
emphasized that only the "clearest of justifications" would warrant dismissal. Under
this strict standard, a court would have difficulty holding that a district court's denial
of a stay was an abuse of discretion. Finding an abuse of discretion would be nearly
impossible in Microsoftivare, in which only one factor favored dismissal. As the
Supreme Court indicated in Colorado River, "[n]o one factor is necessarily deter-
minative .... ",228
In Illinois Bell Telephone v. Illinois Commerce Commission,229 the Seventh
Circuit seems to have acceded to the stricter test. Indeed, even the Second Circuit, the
first court to favor abstention in duplicate litigation cases230 and the court most
reluctant to give up this abstention power23 1 has applied the stricter standard. In
Giardina v. Fontana,232 after reversing a district court stay in a diversity case, the
Second Circuit stated that:
[w]e reach this conclusion with some reluctance in view of the increasing caseload in the
federal courts .... Moreover, we are loath to overturn an exercise of discretion of an
able district judge. But in view of the record before us and what we regard as the most
relevant precedents, we do not think we have any choice. 233
In fact, all the circuits seem to be following the Colorado River and Moses tests
strictly, 234 allowing a stay in only the most exceptional of circumstances. 235
223. Id. at 537.
224. Id. at 538 (quoting Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co.. 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942)).
225. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. I. 26 (1983).
226, See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 138.
228. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States. 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976).
229. 740 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1984).
230. P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.
1949).
231. Giulini v. Blessing, 654 F.2d 189, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1981).
232. 733 F.2d 1047, 1053 (2d Cir. 1984).
233. Id.
234. Forehand v. First Ala. Bank of Dothan, 727 F.2d 1033, 1035-36 (1 Ith Cir. 1984); Kruse v. Snowshoe Co.,
715 F.2d 120, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1983); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 706 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1983).
235. Fox v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 739 F.2d 929 (3rd Cir. 1984) (state court lawsuit had already been settled by
the parties); Board of Educ. of Valley View v. Bosworth, 713 F.2d 1316, 1321-22 (7th Cir. 1983) (the state court had
already rendered judgment on some of the issues and was expected to proceed to judgment on the rest of the issues shortly).
456 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:435
V. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by these lower courts' decisions, Moses limits a district court's
ability to abstain or stay an action in deference to parallel state litigation. No longer
will the federal courts be able to avoid the requirements of Colorado River by
characterizing an abstention as a stay rather than a dismissal. Moreover, with the
burden of proof placed on the party moving for dismissal of the federal action, a court
will have difficulty abstaining except in the most exceptional of circumstances.
Furthermore, considering the strength of the six to three decision, the requirements
for dismissal of a federal action in deference to state court litigation probably will not
change in the near future.
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